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HUGH M. CAPERTON, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.

A.T. MASSEY COAL COMPANY, INC., et al.,

Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
BRIEF OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The Conference of Chief Justices is comprised of the
Chief Justices or Chief Judges of the highest courts of
each State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths
of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, and
the Territories of American Samoa, Guam and the Virgin
Islands. Since 1949, the Conference has been a leading

~ The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and their letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. No counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part, no such counsel or party
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief, and no person other than amicus, its members, and its counsel made such a contribution.

2
national voice on important issues concerning the administration of justice.
The Board of Directors of the Conference of Chief
Justices unanimously authorized the filing of an amicus
curiae brief in this case by a special vote. Where, as
here, a case involves review of a decision of a state Supreme Court, Conference policy provides that the Conference may file an amicus brief only if critical interests
of the state courts are at stake, as they are in this case.
In such cases, it is the policy of the Conference that it not
take a position on the specifics of the decision of the state
Supreme Court at issue. This amicus brief, therefore,
does not take a position on whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a Justice
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to step
aside in this appeal. Tl~is brief has been reviewed and
approved by a special committee of the Conference
chaired by the Chief Justice of North Dakota and composed of the Chief Justices of Indiana, Massachusetts,
Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and Utah.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the concomitant due process or due course of law provisions of various state constitutions set a floor for when a judge must
be disqualified or recused from sitting in a case. See
Bracy v: Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (Due Process
Clause establishes "constitutional floor, not a uniform
standard" for judicial disqualification); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948) ("most
matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise
to a constitutional level").2 Each State sets more rigor2 In some jurisdictions, the terms "disqualification" and "recusal" are
used interchangeably in all situations where a judge steps aside from
hearing a case; elsewhere, one term or the other is used for all such
situations; and in some, each term has a distinct meaning. See Rich-
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ous requirements for disqualification and recusal within
its own jurisdiction, through state constitutional provision, statute, court rule, judicially promulgated canon of
ethics, local practice and/or legal precedent.~ As heads of
their respective judicial systems, the members of the
Conference work to assure that their own jurisdictions,
and the nation as a whole, have court systems that give,
and are seen as giving, access to fair and impartial tribunals for all litigants to resolve their disputes.~ At the
same time, the members want their courts to treat all
disputes efficiently and expeditiously, with minimal opportunities for parties to use delay or obfuscation to frustrate justice.
Accordingly, the Conference submits this amicus brief
to urge the Court (1) to articulate the circumstances and
conditions under which the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment may prevent a state judge from
presiding over a particular matter because of campaign
support, and (2) to consider carefully the criteria that
may be relevant in determining whether a particular
judge is constitutionally disqualified in a particular matter. In an effort to assist the Court, this brief first
ard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges 3-4 (2d ed. 2007). Because of the variety of usages,
this brief uses the terms interchangeably.
3 See Flamm, supra, at 34-35, 824.
4 These concerns are especially important because the majority of
litigation in the United States occurs in state courts. Each year 47
million new non-traffic trial court cases and 283,000 appellate court
cases are filed in the state courts. By contrast, in the federal courts,
320,000 new trial court cases and 5,500 appeals are filed, as are 1.8
million bankruptcy cases. See R. LaFountain, et al., Examining the
Work of State Courts, 2007: A National Perspective from the Court
Statistics Project (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts 2008); Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2007/2007judicial%20business.pdf-

4
(1) surveys the diversity among the States in how judges
are selected and when they may be recused from participating in a case, then (2) reviews the relevant constitutional principles articulated by this Court in prior disqualification challenges, and finally (3) sets forth some of
the practical considerations that may be relevant in resolving a constitutional challenge involving campaign
support.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Conference takes the position that, under certain
circumstances, the Constitution may require the disqualification of a judge in a particular matter because of extraordinarily out-of-line campaign support from a source
that has a substantial stake in the proceedings. As judicial election campaigns become costlier and more politicized, public confidence in the fairness and integrity of
the nation’s elected judges may be imperiled. Disqualification is an increasingly important tool for assuring litigants that they will receive a fair hearing before an irapartial tribunal, particularly since First Amendment attacks have been leveled against several provisions of the
States’ judicial conduct codes.
A judge may be constitutionally disqualified from presiding over a particular matter for reasons other than actual bias or a financial interest in the outcome. These two
categories alone are simply not broad enough to assure
the due-process guarantee, which protects the right to a
fair hearing if extreme facts create a "probability of actual bias * * * too high to be constitutionally tolerable,’’5
encompasses concerns about "possible temptation to the
average * * * judge,’’6 "probability of unfairness,’’7 and
5 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
6 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
7 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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not being "likely to maintain that calm detachment" necessary for a judge to deliver a fair adjudication.8 In particular, political support for a judge may be so extremely
extraordinary that due-process concerns are implicated.
Such instances will be rare, and must be evaluated
pursuant to criteria applied concretely to the particular
facts. Among the aspects to be analyzed are the size, nature, timing and effectiveness of the support, the supporter’s prior political efforts, the pre-existing relationship between the supporter and the judge, and the relationship between the supporter and the litigant in the
particular suit if they are not identical.
ARGUMENT
I. The Context Of Modern Judicial Campaigns
A. How Judges Are Chosen In The States
If distinctions are parsed finely enough, one can identify almost as many different methods of judicial selection as there are States in the Union. Unlike the federal
system, which from its inception has selected judges by
Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation for
life terms during good behavior, the States have never
used a common method of judicial selection. Moreover,
most States have changed the way they choose judges at
some point in their history, often more than once?
Despite the many differences in state judicial selection
systems, all but a handful of States hold popular elections
to choose at least some judges to some benches at some
stage of a judge’s career.1° And in many States, those
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971).
See generally Am. Judicature Soc’y, History of Reform Efforts,
http://www.judicialselection.us/j udicial_selection/reform_eff°rts/f°r
mal_changes_since_inception.cfm.
See generally Am. Judicature Soc’y, Methods of Judicial Selection,
http://www.j udicials election.us/j udicial_selection/meth°ds/selecti°nof_judges.cfm.
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elections are freely and at times fiercely contested by rival candidates.11 In many of those States, candidates run
with the explicit label or at least the implicit imprimatur
of a political party. And while in other States the elections are merely retention votes (that is, a "yes" or "no"
on a judge’s continued service) following an initial appointment-the so-called merit-selection plan--only one
jurisdiction (Green County, Missouri) has moved to merit
selection by popular vote in more than two decades.12
That reality led the Conference of Cl~ief Justices to adopt
a Resolution in 2007 declaring, in part: "Whatever one’s
view of the desirability of judicial elections, a generation
of experience (including recent rebuffs by the voters of
Florida, Ohio, and South Dakota of attempts to eliminate
[contested] judicial elections), makes it clear that elections will stay in many and perhaps all of the States that
have that system.’’1~ Thus, if judicial elections create
problems with the fairness--real and perceived of judicial outcomes, the Conference of Chief Justices and other
groups dedicated to enhancing the effective administra11 Nationwide, 60% of all appellate judges and 80% of all trial judges
face either a partisan or nonpartisan contestable election. See Roy
A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Geo.
L.J. 1077 apps. 1, 2 (2007) (National Center for State Courts data as
of 2004).
~2 Am. Judicature Sot’y, Press Release: Voters in Four Jurisdictions
Opt for Merit Selection on November 4 (2008), http://www.ajs.org/
selection/sel_voters.asp (noting that the decision of a fifth Missouri
county to adopt merit selection for local judges in 2008 "marks the
first time since 1985 that a jurisdiction has moved from contestable
elections to merit selection").
la Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution of February 7, 2007,
http://cej.ncsc.dni.us/JudicialSelectionResolutions/DeclarationJudici
alElections.html. Voters rejected merit selection in Ohio in 1987 and
declined to extend merit selection from appellate to trial courts in
Florida in 2000 and South Dakota in 2004. See Am. Judicature Soc’y,
History of Reform Efforts, supra.
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tion of justice in America must address those problems in
ways that go beyond mere advocacy for judicial selection
reform.
B. How Judicial Campaigns Are Funded
Most elections, whatever their type, share at least one
commonality if voters are presented with more than
one candidate or have an opportunity to vote "no," the
candidates themselves and their supporters bear primary
responsibility for presenting the electorate with sufficient information to cast an informed vote. Only one
State Wisconsinhas any long-standing tradition of
public financing, and that only for its Supreme Court.14
While Wisconsin’s system initially worked well, taxpayer
participation in the voluntary income-tax check-off program that funds the campaigns has declined so dramatically that many candidates now reject public funding altogether.15 Two States North Carolina and New Mexicohave recently adopted voluntary partial public funding for appellate court elections.16 But even if more
14 See Wis. Stat.§ 11.50.
15 In 2007, the available public funds for Wisconsin Supreme Court
candidates totaled $60.816. which turned out to be 2% of the candidates’ $2,655,423 spending. Taxpayer participation in the Wisconsin
check-off system declined from 19.9% in 1979 to 8.7% in 1998. The
number of candidates [for various statewide offices) opting into the
public funding program dropped from 150 in 1986 to 92 in 1999. The
2007 funding data is from the Wisconsin Government Accountability
Board (Richard.Bohringer@Wisconsin.gov); the candidates’ reports
are available at Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Reports Filed Electronically, http://elections.state.wi.us/financereport.asp. The earlier
data is from Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Commission on Public
Financing of Judicial Campaigns 27-29 (2002), http://www.abanet.
org/j udind/pdf/commissionreportA-03.pdf.
16 See North Carolina Judicial Campaign Reform Act of 2002, N.C.
Slat. §§ 163-278.61 to 163-278.70 (appellate judges only); New Mexico Voter Action Act, N.M. Slat. §§ 1-19A-1 to 1-19A-17 (amended in
2007 to include judges subject to statewide elections).
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States adopt similar schemes, independent spending by
private sources will continue unabated. Increasingly, in
hotly-contested contests these uncoordinated independent efforts are dwarfing the amounts raised and spent by
the candidates’ individual campaigns.17 The quaint notion
that "judicial campaigns must focus their solicitations for
funds on members of the bar," Stretton v. Disciplinary
Bd. of the Sup. Ct., 944 F.2d 137, 145 (3d Cir. 1991), has
given way to high-dollar free-for-alls marked by dueling
campaign salvos by organized interest groups, often located outside the State of the election,is
17 In North Carolina in 2008, Democratic Party spending resulted in
the affected candidates being granted "rescue funds." Dan Kane,
Fund ’Rescued’ Candidates from Themselves, News & Observer,
Oct. 24, 2008. And if the independent spending does not use "express advocacy," rescue funds are unlikely and perhaps unconstitutional. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct.
2652 (2007); see also Deborah Goldberg, et al., The New Politics of
Judicial Elections 2004: How Special Interest Pressure on Our
Courts Has Reached a "Tipping Point"--And How To Keep Our
Courts Fair and Impartial 8 (Justice at Stake Campaign 2004) (in
the 2004 Supreme Court elections in Michigan and West Virginia,
interest groups outspent candidates almost 4 to 1 on television advertising); James Sample, et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006: How 2006 Was the Most Threatening Year Yet to the
Fairness and Impartiality of Our Courts--And How Americans
Are Fighting Back 20 (Justice at Stake Campaign 2006) (in the 2006
Supreme Court election in Washington, independent expenditures
totaled more than $2.7 million, nearly doubling the amount raised by
the candidates).
is Wide variations have always existed from State to State, depending on local culture and on formal campaign contribution laws. Thus,
as a 1998 ABA Task Force Report showed, "[A]lthough often attorneys account for large proportions * * * it is also true that often attorneys’ contributions total only a minor fraction. Given the diversity of our jurisdictions, of candidates and of campaigns, the lack of a
general pattern is no surprise." Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of Task
Force on Lawyers’ Political Contributions (Part Two) 89 tbl.2
(1998).
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C. The Dangers Of Judicial Elections
These more expensive, more visible judicial campaigns
have undoubtedly placed new strains on the accepted
norms of judicial behavior, both on the bench and on the
stump. As more judicial races come to resemble campaigns for executive and legislative office, it becomes
harder for both the candidates and the public to perceive
the fundamental distinction between the neutral and reactive role of the judiciary and the policy-initiating
branches of government. Yet these distinctions are fundamental to our system of assuring freedom through
separated powers and checks and balances. Judge (later
Justice) Cardozo described the judicial function in these
terms:
[A]n important distinction separates * * * judicial
from legislative activity. * * * [T]he judge * **
ought, in adherence to the spirit of our modern organization, and in order to escape the dangers of
arbitrary action, to disengage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal or comes
from the particular situation which is presented to
him, and base his judicial decision on elements of an
objective nature.19
As the Conference of Chief Justices asserted in its
amicus brief to this Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White:
The States know that if candidates for judicial office
appeal for voters’ support on the same basis as legislative candidatesif they answer to the same
~9 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 120-121
(1921). Although Cardozo ran unopposed for Associate Judge and
then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Andrew L.
Kaufman, Cardozo 163, 181-182 (1998), he won his initial judicial race
to the New York Supreme Court by defeating an incumbent judge on
a par~y ticket in a very close race, id. at 125.
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electoral majorities--the courts run the grave risk
of becoming second legislatures. As electoral twins
to the legislatures, courts would stand to lose the
essential independence required for them to discharge their high constitutional duty of judicial
review. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
18 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803).20
Yet some have argued that contested elections without
vigorous campaigns are the worst of all worlds. See, e.g.,
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Speech: The Ballot and the
Bench, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 973, 992, 994 (2001) ("Low
voter turnout in judicial elections and inadequate information regarding judicial qualifications diminish the democratic significance of a judicial election. * * * Rather
than scuttling elections because we fear voter ignorance,
we should capitalize on elections as a vehicle for voter
education."); Adair v. State, 709 N.W.2d 567, 580 (Mich.
2006) (Taylor, C.J., and Markman, J.) ("[G]iven the premise of our system of judicial selection that there should be
periodic elections for judicial office, it would seem that it
is better that campaigns be well-funded and informative,
and that candidates be afforded the fullest opportunity to
explain their differing perspectives on the judicial role,
than that campaigns be poorly funded and result in candidates securing election on the basis of little more than a
popular surname.").
D. State Regulation Of Judicial Campaign Conduct
Aware that the necessity of campaigns and campaign
fundraising produces "[a] fundamental tension between
the ideal character of the judicial office and the real
world of electoral politics," Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
20 Br. of Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in No. 01521, at 18 (Feb. 19, 2002).
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380, 400 (1991), all 39 States with elective judiciaries have
devised certain safeguards to help maintain the judiciary’s unique role in the democratic process. The constitutions of every State with any kind of judicial elections
impose unique requirements on judges, most of which
would be unthinkable for other elected officials. In 38 of
the States, judges’ terms are longer than any other elective officials’.21 In 37, only judges are subject to both impeachment and special disciplinary processes.22 In 33,
judges are the only elective officials, aside from attorneys
general or prosecutors, who must meet special requirements of training and/or experience.2~ In 23, only judges
are subject to mandatory age retirement.~4 In 21, only
judicial nominations go through nominating commissions.25 In 18, only judges cannot run for a nonjudicial
office without first resigning.26
The principal safeguard against judicial campaign
abuses, however, has been the States’ codes of judicial
conduct. In every State, the highest court has adopted
such a code, usually modeled closely on the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association.
Every elective State has adopted some variant of the
model code canon that specifically addresses judicial
campaign conduct.
21 Br. of Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in No. 01521, at 6 (Feb. 19, 2002).
22 Id. at 6-7.
23 Id. arT.
24 Ibid.
~ Ibid.
~ Ibid. In addition, all other States have a non-constitutional requirement of "resign to run." See Per Curiam Opinion Concerning
Amendments to Canons 5 and 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 61
Tex. B.J. 64 (Tex. 1998) (adopting resign to run in Texas and noting
that every other State already required all or most judges to resign
when seeking a non-judicial elective office).

12
E. Recent Challenges To Judicial Conduct Codes
The various provisions of the different States’ codes
went largely unchallenged until Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). In that case,
this Court struck down the "announce" clause of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibited judicial
candidates from "’announc[ing] [their] views on disputed
legal or political issues.’" Id. at 768 (quoting Minn. Code
of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). The Announce Clause was taken from the 1972 ABA Model
Code, but it had been deleted from the 1990 Model Code
and remained in force in only eight other States. Because of its limited reach, and because the opinion explicitly cautioned that ’%re neither assert nor imply that the
First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office
to sound the same as those for legislative office," White,
536 U.S. at 783, the Court’s decision had little immediate
effect on state regulation of judicial elections. In the ensuing years, however, challenges have sometimes succeeded against other, more widespread provisions restricting judicial candidates from "mak[ing] pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office,’’27 and
27 Decisions striking down the Pledges and Promises Clause include
at least Bauer v. Shepard, No. 3:08-CV-196, 2008 WL 1994868, at *3,
"17-18 (N.D. Ind. May 6, 2008) (preliminary injunction); Duwe v.
Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976°977 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (enjoined
as applied, not facially); Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 489 F.
Supp. 2d 447, 459-460 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (preliminary injunction) (later
vacated, see below); Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d
879, 888-890 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (later vacated, see below); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1228-1232 (D. Kan. 2006)
(preliminary injunction), questions certified, 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir.
2008), certified questions answered, No. 100,170, 2008 WL 5101311
(Kan. Dec. 5, 2008); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v.
Feldman. 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082-1083 (D. Alaska 2005) (later
vacated, see below); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d
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from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court.’’~s More
to the point of this case, two circuits have struck down

1021, 1035-1042 (D.N.D. 2005); and Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc.
v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 690-704 (E.D. Ky. 2004), motion to
stay injunction pending appeal denied, 388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004).
Decisions upholding the clause include Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Watson, 794
N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2003); and In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003). Still other decisions have
failed to reach the merits of the constitutional challenge to the
clause. See Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir.
2007); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504
F.3d 840, 849-850 (9th Cir. 2007); Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489
F.3d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 2007); Wolfson v. Brammer, No. 3:06-cv-02357,
2007 WL 2288024, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 8, 2007).
~ Decisions striking down the Commit Clause include at least Bauer
v. Shepard, No. 3:08-CV-196, 2008 WL 1994868, at *20 (N.D. Ind.
May 6, 2008) (preliminary injunction); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (enjoined as applied, not facially);
Ind. Right to L ~fe v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 888 (N.D. Ind.
2006) (later vacated, see below); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 1209, 1228-1232 (D. Kan. 2006) (preliminary injunction),
questions certified, 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008), certified questions
answered, No. 100,170, 2008 WL 5101311 (Kan. Dec. 5, 2008); Alaska
Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1082-1083 (D. Alaska 2005) (later vacated, see below); N.D.
Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 (D.N.D. 2005)~
Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672,
711 (E.D. Ky. 2004), motion to stay injunction pending appeal denied,
388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004). Decisions upholding the clause include
Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 387 (E.D. Pa.
2007); and In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 825 (2003). Still other decisions have failed to reach the
merits of the constitutional challenge to the clause. See Ind. Right to
Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 550 (Tth Cir. 2007); Alaska Right to
Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 952-953 (9th
Cir. 2007).
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code provisions that prohibit judges from personally soliciting campaign funds including from people likely to be
litigants or lawyers in their courts.29
The Conference of Chief Justices believes that these
rulings unduly extend this Court’s holding in White. The
Court should affirm the state courts’ legitimate constitutional role in protecting the due process rights of all litigants to fair and impartial trials in elective judicial systerns.
F. The Increasing Importance Of Recusal
Every State permits litigants who fear that they cannot receive impartial justice to ask for another judge to
hear their case. American courts, like English courts before them, have always recognized the legal maxim nemo
debet esse iudex in propria causa, or "no one should be
the judge in his own cause." Thus, the federal system
and every State have devised their own set of laws, rules,
practices, procedures and/or precedents to govern challenges to judges in particular matters.~° As might be expected, both the standards and procedures to disqualify a
judge differ among the various jurisdictions.~1
29 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763-767 (8th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (striking downclause as applied to solicitation to
large groups); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir.
2002) (striking down Solicitation Clause because ’~ve believe that the
Supreme Court’s decision [in White] * * * suggests that the standard
for judicial election should be the same as the standard for legislative
and executive elections"); see also Yost v. Stout, No. 06-4122 JAR (D.
Kan. Nov. 16, 2008) (granting summary judgment striking down the
Kansas Solicitation Clause).
3o See Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and
Disqualification of Judges 34-35 (2d ed. 2007).
31 Id. at 488, 824 ("procedural prerequisites to disqualification vary
greatly" and "precisely what a party needs to show in order to carry
its burden on disqualification varies considerably from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction").
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Given the sharp rise in judicial campaign spending, the
related increase in politicized judicial campaigns, and the
emerging questions about the constitutionality of judicial
conduct codes, recusal and disqualification have become
ever more important in States with vigorously contested
judicial elections. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
White notes that "[a]rticulated standards of judicial conduct may advance [judicial integrity]," which is "a state
interest of the highest order.’’~2 States that choose an
elected judiciary may "strive to define those characteristics that exemplify judicial excellence" and may "enshrine
[their] definitions in a code of judicial conduct.’’~ They
may "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due
process requires, and censure judges who violate these
standards.’’~4 The same groups who have challenged the
other code provisions with some success have, with but a
single exception, failed in their attempts to have code
disqualification standards struck down.~5 As one recent
study opined:

32 536 U.S. at 793.
~ Id. at 794.
~4 Ibid.
~5 The challenges failed in Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp.
2d 879, 887 (N.D. Ind. 2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 1209, 1234-1235, 1239 (D. Kan. 2006) (preliminary injunction); Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36, 2006 WL 2916814, at "15-16
(E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006) (finding challenge to recusal requirements
not ripe for judicial review because no injury in fact); Wolfson v.
Brammer, No. 3:06-cv-02357, 2007 WL 2288024, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug.
8, 2007); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman,
380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083-1084 (D. Alaska 2005); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1043-1044 (D.N.D. 2005); and
Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672,
710 (E.D. Ky. 2004). The one successful challenge came in Duwe v.
Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
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With the canons of judicial conduct looking increasingly precarious in the wake of White, courts and
litigants are left with precious few reliable mechanisms to safeguard the constitutional right to due
process. Recusal is one such remaining safeguard,
and, because it is tailored to the specific factual circumstances of the case at issue, it does not trigger
the same First Amendment scrutiny as canons limiting judicial speech.
James Sample, David Pozen & Michael Young, Fair
Courts: Setting Recusal Standards 25 (2008).
Thus, disqualification is perhaps the States’ most reliable weapon for maintaining both the reality and the appearance of a "fair hea~ng in a fair tribunal" for every
litigant. Through tailored case-by-case recusals, decided
under clearly articulated standards, States can accomplish the same goals they have sought to achieve through
speech, contribution or spending limitations, yet with little risk of First Amendment challenges.
G. Evolving Notions Of Disqualification
This new role for an old remedy has been enhanced by
evolving notions of what circumstances properly require
a judge to step aside. At common law, the only ground
for disqualification was that the judge had a financial interest in the case at bar.~6 In modern times, instant communications, speedy travel, and, in most jurisdictions, a
ready pool of available jurists now allow a substitute

~6 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-544 (1994) ("Required
judicial recusal for bias did not exist in England at the time of Blackstone. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries "361. * * * Not until 1911,
however, was a provision enacted requiring district-judge recusal for
bias in general."); see Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or
Suppression: Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign
Speech, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 5637 573 (2004).
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judge to be assigned with little expense or delay.37 In
these circumstances, judges should consider not only
whether bias or self-interest actually exists, but also
whether appearances would lead a reasonable person to
think they exist.38 Thus, Canon 3(E)(1) of the ABA’s
1990 Model Code (now Canon 2, Rule 2.11(A) under the
2007 revisions) succinctly provides: "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’~9
This standard is now employed, either verbatim or in
substance, by virtually every State, either by statute,
procedural rule and/or code provision.4° Canon 3(E)(1) of
37 Flamm, supra, at 600.
~ See Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding
Appearances, 48 S. Tex. L. Rev. 911 (2007); M. Margaret McKeown,
Don’t Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety
Standard, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 45 (2005); Leslie W. Abramson,
Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55
(2000); Bradley A. Siciliano, Attorney Contributions in Judicial
Campaigns: Creating the Appearance of Impropriety, 20 Hofstra L.
Rev. 217 (1991).
39 Reflecting rising recognition of the need to protect fair hearing
rights, the current provision affords greater protection than its
predecessor in the 1972 Model Code: "A judge should disqualify
himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."
40 See Sample, Pozen & Young, supra, at 17 (ABA’s general standard
incorporated into the judicial conduct codes of forty-seven States,
counting Michigan, Montana and Texas as the exceptions). Texas,
however, follows the ABA standard by rule. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
18b(2)(a) (a judge "shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which
* * * his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"). Montana
recently adopted the ABA standard in the 2008 Montana Code of
Judicial Conduct, effective January 1, 2009, Rule 2.i2 of which includes the "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" standard
for disqualification. See In the Matter of the 2008 Montana Code of
Judicial Conduct, No. AF 08-0203 (Mont. Dec. 12, 2008). Thus, only
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West Virginia’s Code of Judicial Conduct, for example,
incorporates this provision into its disqualification standard. In turn, West Virginia’s appellate rules provide
that "[a] justice shall disqualify himself or herself, upon
proper motion or sua sponte, in accordance with the provisions of Canon 3(E)(1) or, when sua sponte, for any
other reason the justice deems appropriate." W. Va.
R.A.P. 29(b).
II. Due Process Requires Judges Who Will "Hold The
Balance Nice, Clear And True’’41
The Conference submits that the Due Process Clause
may require a judge to s~ep aside in some circumstances
because of campaign support.42 If the Due Process
Clause requires recusal only when a party could prove
actual bias arising from personal animus in the judge’s
heart or cold cash in.the judge’s pocket, then the rights of
parties to a fair and impartial judge would be imperiled.
Probabilities of unfairness, likelihood of bias, and unacceptable perceptions are at the heart of circumstantial
Michigan has yet to adopt the ABA standard by rule or code. Michigan’s Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D) provides: "A disqualification of a judge may be remitted as provided by Michigan Court
Rule 2.003(D)." Rule 2.003(D) provides that a "judge is disqualified
when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which: [list including personal bias for or against
party or attorney, personal knowledge of facts, prior role as attorney
in matter, economic interest, or third degree relationship to party,
attorney, witness, or interested party]." At least one Justice of the
Michigan Supreme Court has publicly advocated that Michigan
adopt the ABA "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" standard. Adair v. State, 709 N.W.2d 567, 581 (Mich. 2006) (statement of
Cavanagh, J.).
41 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
~ Some litigants may "game" this system by filing meritless motions
to secure delay, to run expenses, or to shop for a better forum.
States employ various means to terminate baseless or bad-faith motions quickly and efficiently.

19
evidence, which is sometimes the only evidence available
on the issue of whether a judge is constitutionally required to disqualify.43 Few of this Court’s cases involving
due process challenges to a judge involve direct evidence
of bias instead, they involve circumstances where the
probability of judicial bias is intolerable, regardless of the
particular judge’s actual state of mind.
When a challenge was lodged to a conviction rendered
by a judge and mayor who received court costs in the
event of conviction but nothing for acquittal, the Court
held: "[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial
procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of
the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could
carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure
which would offer a possible temptation to the average
-man as a judge to forget the burden of proof * * * or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the State and the accused denies the
latter due process of law." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
532 (1927). This Court did not consider whether the adjudicator was actually biased. Rather, the Court evaluated the circumstances and decided that the probability
of bias for this judge was too great for the Constitution to
countenance.
Due process would risk being a mere facade if it ignored all concerns about "the probability of unfairness."
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) ("[n]ot only is a
biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but
’our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness’" (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial ~of cases. But our system
See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty
in Judicial Ethics, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1059, 1087 (1996).
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of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness."). For example, this Court held that
due process required a state supreme court justice to
step aside from reviewing a verdict for bad-faith refusal
to pay an insurance claim because the justice was at that
time pursuing his own bad-faith suit against an insurance
company and the legal principles established by the state
supreme court’s decision had an impact on the outcome of
the justice’s own case. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
U.S. 813, 825 (1986). This Court did not "decide whether
in fact Justice Embry was influenced," but noted that the
"possible temptation" that the circumstances offered "to
the average * * * judge to * * * lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true" was enough to require
recusal under the Due Process Clause. Ibid. (quoting
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)
(quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532)).
Similarly, this Court held that due process required
the recusal of a judge who had been subjected to repeated verbal abuse by a criminal defendant because
"[n]o one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that
calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication." Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971). This
"likel[ihood]" of bias was sufficient to require recusal under the Due Process Clause despite the absence of any
evidence that the judge harbored an actual bias against
the defendant.
"The requirement of neutrality has been jealously
guarded by this Court." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980). To give litigants the benefit of an
unbiased and impartial judge, the Constitution forbids
procedures that create a probability that prejudice will
result. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-251
(1977) (due process is violated when justices of the peace
are only paid when they issue search warrants, even if
actual bias is not shown); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

21
471,485-486 (1972) (due process is violated when a parole
officer makes the determination of whether reasonable
grounds exist for the revocation of parole because "[t]he
officer directly involved in making recommendations
cannot always have complete objectivity in evaluating
them"); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("even ff
there is no showing of actual bias in the tribunal, * * *
due process is denied by circumstances that create the
likelihood or the appearance of bias"); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (due process is violated when
key witnesses serve as bailiffs for jury; no showing of actual bias is required because the circumstances are inherently suspect); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
(jury simultaneously deciding admission of evidence and
guilt of defendant violates due process regardless of
whether defendant can show jury bias). This "stringent
rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties."
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. The "inquiry must be not
only whether there was actual bias on [the judge’s] part,
but also whether there was ’such a likelihood of bias or an
appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the
balance * * * ’" Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501
(1974) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588
(1964)).
Applying this rule, this Court held that an administrative board composed of optometrists violated the litigants’ due process rights by presiding over disciplinary
hearings against competing optometrists. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973). Moreover, this Court
held that it was inconsistent w/th due process for a village
mayor to preside over a hearing for violation of a village
ordinance where the mayor was responsible for the village’s finances, which depended to a significant extent

22
upon the fines levied in such proceedings. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
The appearance of likely bias is relevant not solely to
public perception and confidence in the judicial system,
but may be the only evidence of actual bias. Often there
is simply no provable evidence of actual bias; even the
judge might be unconscious of its presence. Indeed, appearances arising from specific facts may be the only indication that actual bias is present in fact.
While there is a presumption of integrity in the judiciary, the very fact that it is merely a presumption indicates that in some situations it can and will be overcome.
Thus, in evaluating whether a judge’s potential bias violates a litigant’s due process rights, the question is not
whether a judge of the highest integrity may be able to
resist the temptation of partiality. Rather, the question
is whether an average judge would be tempted under the
circumstances.
Given the ubiquity of judicial elections and the everincreasing amounts of campaign spending in those elections, circumstances can be imagined in which campaign
support "Would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required
* * * or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true.’" Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532). Therefore, one cannot say
categorically that campaign support can never rise to
such magnitude that a judge would be constitutionally
prohibited from sitting in a case where the source of that
support has a substantial stake in the proceedings.
Because the applicability of the Due Process Clause in
the campaign spending context depends on the particular
facts of each case, no bright-line rule can or should be attempted. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972) ("Due process is flexible and calls for such
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procedural protections as the particular situation demands."); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("The very nature of due process
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation. * * * ’"Due
process" * * * is not a technical conception with a f’Lxed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ It is
’compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions * * * .’"). "Due process of law requires that the
proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an
absolute, concept. It is fairness with reference to particular conditions or particular results." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
Some may claim that allowing any due process challenge to an elective judge because of campaign support
might open the floodgates for thousands of constitutional
disqualification challenges against elective judges who
preside over cases involving supporters and contributors.
Such a fear, the Conference submits, is unfounded. A
due process review of a challenged failure to recuse
would be limited to cases of extraordinary support.
deed, we know of only two other instances as extreme as
this one in terms of size of the expenditure and percentage of the total support for a candidate. Even if one
might raise more examples from the decades of thousands of campaigns and scores of millions in spending,
there clearly are few outliers.
The first instance was in the 1982 Texas Democratic
Primary, where an active litigant, a controversial "South
Texas rancher and oil man," contributed $200,000 to one
unsuccessful Supreme Court candidate, accounting for
over 90% of that candidate’s contributions, as well as
about 33% of the funds raised by a successful Supreme
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Court candidate. The second instance came in a supreme court race in Illinois in 2006, where justices are
elected from districts, not statewide. The employees and
other persons affiliated with a party to a case directly
contributed over $350,000 to the successful candidate; in
addition, some of them founded a PAC that directly contributed another $1.2 million.45
III. Criteria For Evaluating Whether Due Process
Requires Recusal For Campaign Spending In A
Particular Case
This case is an opportunity, acutely needed, to clarify
the analysis to be considered in deciding whether a
recusal is constitutionally required because of campaign
support. After all, if there are judicial elections, there
will be campaigns and campaign spending. Even though
judicial campaign spending has risen more sharply in recent years than other campaign spending,46 and even
though high-dollar campaigns have undoubtedly affected
public perceptions about judicial impartiality,47 not every
44 Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in
Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 84 (1986); Asker, ’82 Supreme Court Races
Signal End of Erc~ Assert Winners, Losers, Houston Post, May 3,
1982.
45 See Pet. in Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 05-842, at
6-8 & n.2 (Dec. 27, 2005); see also Deborah Goldberg, James Sample
& David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should
Lead Recusal Reform, 46 Washburn L.J. 503, 509-511 (2007). The
relevan~ district’s total population was 1,290,401. See 2005 Annual
Report of the Illinois Courts: Administrative Summary 29.
46 See Bert Brandenburg & Leo A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The
Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 Geo~ J. Legal Ethics 1229, 1230 n.5 (2008).
47 For two national polls and eight single-state polls conducted between 1995 and 2004 reflecting public skepticism about the effect of
contributions on judicial outcomes, see Thomas A. Gottschalk, Judicial Recusal as a Campaign Finance Reform app. A (Sandra Day
O’Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary, 2008 Conference:
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judge who has been involved in a high-dollar, vigorous
campaign can be presumed to have a probability or likelihood of bias whenever a matter in which some supporter is vitally interested later comes before the judge’s
court.
The Conference of Chief Justices submits that several
criteria must be evaluated in deciding whether campaign
support has been so egregious as to create a "probability" or "likelihood" of bias that would jeopardize a litigant’s due process right to a fair hearing. The following
seven criteria are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, but
they do reflect issues that we have encountered in the
judicial campaign finance context and that we believe are
relevant to a constitutional inquiry.
A. Size Of The Expenditure
The amount of suppor~ given by the interested party
must be considered. No set amount can be labeled as
"beyond the pale" for all cases; circumstances always
matter. For example, the size of the jurisdiction and the
electorate to be persuaded is crucial: What is exorbitant
in a small city like The Dalles, Oregon, may be unre-

Our Courts and Corporate Citizenship) (publication forthcoming).
Some media attention about contributions to judicial campaigns unduly amplifies concerns about impropriety. For example, the New
Yo rk Times reported a forthcoming law review article that attacked
Louisiana Supreme Court Justices about their campaign contributions. But the Times never reported (except on NYTimes.com as an
"Editor’s Note Appended," Sept. 20, 2008) that, after publication, the
author’s dean (at Tulane Law School) sent a formal apology to that
court because of the article’s errors. See Adam Liptak, Looking
Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
2008; Vernon Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme
Cour~ in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 Tul. L. Rev.
1291 (2008); SuSan Finch, Tulane Law School Issues Apology to
Louisiana Supre me Court. Times-Picayune, Sept. 16, 2008.
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markable in a metropolitan jurisdiction like Dallas,
Texas. Standard practice in a jurisdiction is also a vital
component; an amount of support that is outrageous in a
State like Minnesota, which has for many decades had
only low-key judicial contests, might be routine in a
smaller State, such as Alabama, where multi-million dollar court races are frequent. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230, 252-256 (2006) (considering local practice in determining the constitutionally of Vermont’s campaign
regulation). Even within a single State, from year to
year, from court to court, or from county to county, an
amount that might possibly offend due process in one instance will simply not in another.4s
B. Nature Of The Support
Second, the nature of the support, and its benefit to
the candidate and his or her candidacy, must be considered.49 In some jurisdictions, a judge must sign the public reports detailing all contributions to his or her campaign; but the judge has no similar knowledge about any
independent support. In some jurisdictions, judicial candidates control their campaign treasuries and have wide
discretion over how to spend or dispose of campaign
~s Presumably, a contribution that complied with a contribution limit
set by statute or rule would not violate due process. However, situations may arise that would test that proposition. For example, if
every member of one law f’Lrm contributes the maximum amount allowed and if the aggregate of those contributions constitutes (say)
80% of a candidate’s campaign funds, such support would comply
with the law but might be such an out-of-line concentration of support as to raise obvious concerns.
49 A further problem is caused by direct contributions or independent
expenditures against a judge. On the one hand, efforts to defeat a
judge are every bit as likely to affect that judge’s attitudes toward a
party as are efforts to support that judge. On the other hand, a
wealthy lawyer or litigant could always consider spending enough to
defeat or at least disqualify a disfavored judge.
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funds; independent expenditures risk being illegal if the
candidate exercises any control over them or even coordinates with them. A problematic direct contribution
could be returned, but a candidate has no power over independent expenditures, whether effective or not.5°
C. Timing Of The Support
Third, the timing of contributions or independent support is a critical factor. If the supporter’s case is pending
or about to be pending before the court on which the candidate sits or to which he or she seeks election, obviously
a large contribution or expenditure is more likely to create a probability or likelihood of bias than if the case had
not yet arisen or its assignment was subject to a random
process so that it might never come before the successful
candidate .51 Obviously, the more remote in time the sup5o Although some people are skeptical about the "independence" of
independent spending, not only is there a constitutional right to such
participation in campaigns, but at least in judicial campaigns, independent spending has backfired against the candidate it was intended to advance. One instance was in 2000, when the Chief Justice
of Mississippi’s defeat was apparently due to reaction against an independent effort. See Associated Press, Chief Justice Asks U.S.
Chamber of Commerce to Stop Running TV Ads, Comm. Appeal,
Oct. 22, 2000; Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000:
Change and Challenge, 2001 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 877. Similarly in North Carolina in 1986, the Chief Justice’s defeat was caused
at least in part by independent spending aimed at supporting her.
The Chief Justice described the independent group’s effort: "Some
of their tactics * * * were offensive, and I asked them to discontinue
them, but * * * I had no means of controlling them. * * * I know that
they offended a large number of people." Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1391,
1404 (2001) (quoting letter to author from former Chief Justice Rhoda Billings).
~1 One example of problematic timing: A challenge was made to two
justices of the Ohio Supreme Court who had received large contributions from a law firm only three weeks before voting on whether or
not to review a particular case. The firm had a multi-million dollar
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port was given, the less likely it is to create problems of a
constitutional magnitude.
D. Effectiveness Of The Support
Fourth, the effectiveness of the support, both actual
and perceived, must be considered. This is particularly
true of independent expenditureshtl~e more the message
is pointed to the particular campaign, the more likely that
it might constitute a due process violation.
E. Nature Of Supporter’s Prior Political Activities
Fifth, the supporter’s record of campaign activity
must be considered. If the supporter has habitually
made large contributions to or made independent expenditures on behalf of many candidates in the past, the support for one jurist who may later happen to preside over
a case in which the supporter was involved would raise
less suspicion than if the support was novel or extraordinary.
F. Nature Of Supporter’s Pre-Existing Relationship With The Judge
Sixth, the history between the supporter and the
judge must be explored. A prior friendship or professional relationship may help explain the size of the support, but may raise other, perhaps still more pertinent
concerns about the probability or likelihood of judicial
bias. If the contributor had roles beyond writing a check,
such as chairing a campaign committee or raising money
from others, that may exacerbate the situation. On the
other hand, if the judge in question has decided other
matters involving the supporter with no indication of

contingent fee at stake in the matter and contributions from the lawyers and their spouses amounted to almost five percent of each justice’s total campaign funds. See Pet. in Consol. Rail Corp. v. Wightman, No. 99-950, at 7-8 (Mar. 6, 2000).
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bias, then concerns about a lack of fairness may be reduced.
G. Relationship Between The Supporter And The
Litigant
Finally, the relationship between the supporter and
the party to the case must be considered. Of course,
when the outlying support is provided by an individual
litigant, the relationship is obvious and no further questions arise. But should the same rules apply to suppor~
by a party’s lawyer? And if the party is a corporation,
partnership or other entity, and the donor is an officer,
director, partner, shareholder or employee of the party,
then the exact nature of the relationship must be explored. Obviously, the closer the identity between the
supporter and the party, the more likely that due process
concerns will be implicated.
CONCLUSION
Amicus curiae, the Conference of Chief Justices, respectfully requests that this Court clarify the applicability of the Due Process Clause to motions to disqualify
based on campaign support and articulate the considerations that should be weighed in deciding whether the
Constitt~tion requires recusal.
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